U.S. Treasury action under Operation Economic Outcast blocks property of Iranian and Chinese-linked procurement nodes supplying connectors and dual-use electronics to MODAFL subordinates developing UAVs and solid-fueled ballistic missiles.
IN BRIEF: On September 29, 2026, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control designated Iran-based Kavoshcom Asia R and D Group, its director Ali Fotowat Ahmady, Hong Kong-based EC Mojo Technology Co Limited and China-based Li Fen pursuant to Executive Order 13382 for providing electronics, including connectors, in support of Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics subordinates HESA and Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group.
RECORD:
Date: September 29, 2026
Beat: Chip-War Control Ledger + Security & Exploits
Jurisdiction: United States (OFAC); Iran, Hong Kong, China
Entity: Kavoshcom Asia R and D Group; Ali Fotowat Ahmady; EC Mojo Technology Co Limited; Li Fen
Instrument / cite: Executive Order 13382 designation (press release sb0637)
Source type: Official OFAC press release
Confidence: confirmed
Record ID: sb0637
Primary Source: U.S. Department of Treasury
The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control designated Iran-based Kavoshcom Asia R and D Group, its director Ali Fotowat Ahmady, Hong Kong-based EC Mojo Technology Co Limited and China-based representative Li Fen on September 29, 2026. The designations target the procurement of electronics, including connectors, for two subordinates of Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics: Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company (HESA) and Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group.
Kavoshcom procured the components for HESA, a MODAFL subordinate that specializes in the development of unmanned aerial vehicles and military aircraft, and for Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group, a subordinate of MODAFL’s Aerospace Industries Organization responsible for Iran’s solid-fueled ballistic missile program. Ali Fotowat Ahmady, as director of Kavoshcom, signed correspondence to HESA on the company’s behalf. EC Mojo Technology Co Limited supplied electronic components in support of Kavoshcom’s efforts. Li Fen, acting as EC Mojo’s China-based representative, attempted to evade sanctions and export controls while providing those services. Iran-based Kavoshcom representative Parisa Lali also facilitated procurements for HESA.
OFAC acted pursuant to Executive Order 13382, which targets proliferators of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The action forms part of Operation Economic Outcast, announced by Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent on August 24, 2026. Secretary Bessent stated: “Under Operation Economic Outcast, Treasury will continue to target and disrupt those who provide material, technological, or financial support that allows the Iranian regime to sustain its terrorist enterprise.” Treasury will not tolerate any support to the regime and will continue to identify, expose, and isolate Iran’s enablers. The designations further degrade the Iranian regime’s ability to reconstitute its weapons programs and raise costs for those who aid Tehran’s military procurement.
HESA was previously designated by OFAC pursuant to E.O. 13382 on September 17, 2008, for being owned or controlled by MODAFL and for providing support to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Aerospace Industries Organization and Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group appear in the Annex to E.O. 13382. MODAFL itself was designated by the U.S. Department of State in October 2007 in connection with Iran’s ballistic missile program. All property and interests in property of the newly designated persons that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. Entities owned 50 percent or more by blocked persons are also blocked. U.S. persons are generally prohibited from transactions involving the blocked persons’ property. Non-U.S. persons risk secondary sanctions exposure for significant transactions on behalf of the designated parties.
For technology executives and investors, the designations illuminate persistent third-country intermediation in dual-use electronics supply chains that touch UAV and missile programs. Hong Kong and mainland China entities appear as nodes for components that Iranian industrial groups cannot source openly. The explicit reference to connectors and attempts to evade export controls signals elevated scrutiny of any firm whose products or logistics touch similar procurement pathways.
WHY IT MATTERS:
The designations convert previously opaque procurement relationships into SDN-list exposure, raising immediate compliance and secondary-sanctions risk for any electronics supplier, logistics provider or investor whose counterparties intersect Hong Kong, Chinese or Iranian dual-use channels linked to MODAFL subordinates. Enterprise buyers of aerospace and defense-adjacent components now face heightened diligence demands around ultimate end-use.